CHINA RIGHTS MONITOR

China's Red Notices, Extradition and Repatriation Requests

Legal tools, state motives, regional enforcement differences and outcome patterns

A cross-jurisdictional investigation based on 39 public cases

CRM-RP-2026-012 | Full investigation report | Version 1.0
Publication and evidence cut-off: 30 July 2026
Sources: public judgments, government material, international organisations and reliable investigations

Executive summary: the power of a Red Notice lies in connection, not command

An INTERPOL Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant and does not itself create a universal duty to arrest or extradite. Its practical power lies in connecting a domestic criminal allegation to global policing, border, visa, immigration and private compliance systems. A person may never be extradited and still experience airport arrest, prolonged detention, restricted travel, visa refusal, banking disruption, reputational damage and repeated proceedings in several jurisdictions.

For China, a Red Notice rarely operates alone. Public cases reveal a combined chain: domestic investigation and warrant; INTERPOL data circulation; overseas location and provisional arrest; formal extradition or administrative removal; police and diplomatic liaison; pressure through relatives, assets or business relationships; and persuaded return. The chain is convertible. Extradition refusal does not necessarily end immigration or police-transfer risk, and deletion by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) does not automatically cancel a domestic warrant or terminate an already-open national proceeding.

This report classifies 39 publicly verifiable individual cases or group transfers. The sample is not the complete universe of Chinese Red Notices. Most notices are not public, unsuccessful cases are more likely to produce judgments and rights reporting, and many Asian administrative transfers leave little judicial record. The sample cannot generate an overall success rate. It can, however, identify recurring mechanisms, regional differences and legally significant failure points.

The evidence supports a clear but bounded conclusion. China uses INTERPOL Red Notices on a sustained, centralised and institutional basis, especially in anti-corruption and economic-fugitive operations. Chinese official data itself shows that corruption, bribery, embezzlement, fraud, money laundering and related property offences occupy a prominent place in the Top 100 Red Notice programme. In a smaller set of strongly evidenced cases, economic allegations have intersected with political evidence-gathering, family pressure, elite power struggles or transnational repression.

The strongest public example is Businessman H. in France. China sought him through a notice framed around money laundering and misappropriation. French judicial material and the ICIJ investigation indicated that pressure for his return was also connected to obtaining cooperation in the politically sensitive Sun Lijun case, including action against a relative and conditional discussion of withdrawing pursuit. That evidence supports a finding of instrumental use in the individual case; it does not establish that H. was innocent of every alleged financial act, or that all Chinese economic notices are fabricated.

Core finding: China treats Red Notices as routine state infrastructure for anti-corruption and economic-fugitive pursuit. That infrastructure has both legitimate law-enforcement capacity and demonstrated political-instrumental capacity. The correct response is penetrating case-specific review, not automatic execution and not blanket refusal.

1. Distinguishing Red Notices, extradition, removal and persuaded return

1.1 A Red Notice is an international policing request

INTERPOL describes a Red Notice as a request to law-enforcement authorities worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender or similar legal action. It is based on a national warrant or court order. INTERPOL does not itself issue an international warrant, determine guilt or compel member countries to arrest. Each country decides the legal value it gives the notice under domestic law. [1]

The same Chinese notice may therefore lead to airport detention and judicial extradition review in France, provide intelligence but no direct arrest basis in the United States, or move rapidly into administrative removal in another state. The international data object is similar; the consequences are fragmented.

1.2 Formal extradition is a state-to-state legal process

Formal extradition commonly depends on a bilateral treaty, multilateral convention or domestic statute. Courts may consider identity, dual criminality, evidential sufficiency, limitation periods, political-offence exclusions, capital punishment, torture, detention conditions and trial fairness. A minister or executive authority may retain a final decision. A Red Notice may begin provisional arrest, but it cannot replace a complete extradition request.

1.3 Removal and police transfer may become disguised extradition

When formal extradition meets evidential or human-rights obstacles, the requesting and territorial states may use visa cancellation, illegal-stay removal, national-security expulsion, border return or direct police transfer. The physical result can be identical to extradition while procedural safeguards are weaker. Lai Changxing's removal from Canada, Macau-to-mainland transfers, and Southeast Asian transfers of Taiwanese fraud suspects illustrate how an administrative route can achieve surrender without a conventional extradition judgment.

1.4 Persuaded return is not automatically voluntary

Some targets return after rationally weighing sentence, immigration status, cost and family interests. Public investigations also describe exit restrictions on relatives, detention or questioning of family members, asset pressure and approaches through business partners. Voluntariness must therefore be analysed as a factual spectrum, not inferred from the absence of physical handover.

2. Why China uses Red Notices: five overlapping state motives

2.1 Ordinary crime and transnational public safety

Not every Chinese request should be presumed political. Fraud, violence, narcotics, money laundering, online gambling and organised cybercrime create genuine victims. Southeast Asian governments have independent reasons to dismantle scam compounds, protect tourism and address trafficking. Police cooperation in these cases can serve ordinary public safety, while evidence, jurisdiction and transfer risk still require separate review.

2.2 Anti-corruption, fugitive recovery and asset recovery

Operation Fox Hunt in 2014 and Sky Net in 2015 institutionalised overseas fugitive pursuit as a central governance programme. The public Top 100 Red Notice list combined INTERPOL circulation, naming and shaming, diplomatic engagement, asset recovery and persuaded return. Official reporting states that 62 of the Top 100 had returned by 2025. 'Returned' includes arrest, deportation, persuaded return, arrest after entry and other routes; it is not synonymous with 62 formal extraditions. [9][17]

2.3 Regaining procedural control over sensitive cases

Physical transfer gives Chinese authorities central control over the suspect, evidence, assets and information. In fraud cases China often argues that victims, communications and money flows are concentrated in the mainland. When Taiwanese residents are involved, destination becomes a dispute over criminal jurisdiction, consular access and the implementation of One-China diplomacy.

2.4 Overseas extension of national-security, religious and ethnic governance

Requests concerning Uyghur activists, Falun Gong practitioners, political dissidents or persons labelled separatist or terrorist engage Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, which prohibits intervention of a political, military, religious or racial character. Refugee status and non-refoulement obligations become central. The Idris Hasan case shows that an INTERPOL deletion and a state's extradition process can move on different legal tracks.

2.5 Diplomatic capacity and security partnership

Extradition treaties, joint police operations and fugitive transfers are also products of state relationships. Anti-corruption, anti-scam, narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation can produce reciprocal benefits and support broader trade, investment or security ties. A decision may therefore be embedded in a bilateral agenda even when the file presents as technical criminal cooperation.

3. The multi-tool, convertible cross-border chain

Stage	Common action by China	Possible territorial response	Main legal issue
Domestic start	Investigation, warrant, wanted notice and asset action	Usually no immediate public action	Authenticity, evidence and institutional independence
International circulation	Red Notice application or diffusion	Entry into policing and border systems	INTERPOL Articles 2 and 3; accuracy and proportionality
Location and arrest	Request provisional arrest and submit initial file	Airport arrest, detention, bail or monitoring	Domestic arrest basis and detention limit
Formal request	Extradition documents and diplomatic assurances	Court and ministerial review	Dual criminality, political purpose, torture and fair trial
Route conversion	Immigration, visa, deportation or police liaison	Administrative removal or direct transfer	Non-refoulement, asylum and effective remedy
Peripheral pressure	Relatives, assets, commercial contacts and return persuasion	Possible foreign-interference concern	Voluntariness, sovereignty and obstruction of justice

The essential feature is convertibility. Extradition refusal may leave travel restrictions, immigration exposure, domestic arrest data and family pressure intact. Conversely, CCF deletion may not terminate national detention or extradition unless the state updates its own databases and legal file.

4. What the data shows: outcomes are not single events

European refusals or restraints in the sample cluster after 2019 and include Sweden, the Czech Republic, France, Poland, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Albania and Spain. Asian and some Global South cases more often end in physical transfer, including batches of Taiwanese fraud suspects from Cambodia, the extradition of She Zhijiang from Thailand, Uyghur removals and police transfers from African jurisdictions.

This pattern cannot be converted into a valid success percentage. It does show institutional divergence. Case type and identity influence scrutiny: ordinary violence, narcotics and fraud tend to receive more assistance; religious, ethnic, expression, national-security and politically selective anti-corruption backgrounds trigger stronger Article 3 and non-refoulement concerns.

Independent country material is outcome-relevant. Courts relying mainly on diplomatic assurances may approve transfer; courts that systematically examine UN records, government country information and specialist reporting are more likely to identify system-wide or individual risk. Duration itself is an outcome: Hasan spent 43 months in detention before release, and Hung Tao Liu's prolonged Polish detention produced a separate Article 5 violation.

A proper dataset must distinguish at least six stages: notice circulation, arrest, extradition approval, executive approval, physical transfer and post-return treatment. A binary success/failure label conceals the practical burden created before final disposition.

5. Special investigation: economic cases as a high-frequency gateway and potential political weapon

5.1 What the evidence proves - and what it does not

The claim that China 'likes using Red Notices' becomes testable when defined by three indicators: sustained central policy, repeated use in named priority lists, and deliberate combination with publicity, diplomacy, assets and return persuasion. On those indicators the public record supports an affirmative finding.

ICIJ, referring to Chinese official statements, reported that at least 479 persons characterised as suspects had been located, arrested or repatriated through INTERPOL channels over a decade. This cannot be treated as 479 court-reviewed extraditions because the measure combines different routes. It nevertheless demonstrates that INTERPOL is a hub in the pursuit system rather than an occasional document. [8]

The offence profile is especially important. Xinhua reported that more than sixty per cent of the Top 100 were suspected of embezzlement or bribery and that 48 had held leading or key positions. A Supreme People's Procuratorate analysis of 35 returned persons listed embezzlement, bribery, fraud and abuse of power, with almost half suspected of embezzlement. Later official summaries continued to list bribery, misappropriation, money laundering, false VAT invoices and fraud. [18][19][20]

Investigative conclusion: There is sufficient evidence that China routinely uses Red Notices for anti-corruption and economic-fugitive pursuit and values their location, exposure, travel-restriction and deterrent effects. There are fewer but strong cases showing political instrumentalisation. There is insufficient public evidence to conclude that all, most or a majority of Chinese economic notices are fabricated.

5.2 Why economic offences provide effective legal packaging

First, economic offences travel easily under dual-criminality rules. Fraud, laundering, embezzlement and breach of trust are offences in most systems and attract less immediate Article 3 suspicion than sedition, separatism, religion or expression charges.

Second, the facts are complex and asymmetrical. Corporate control, nominee ownership, related-party transactions, local finance and cross-border money flows may cover years. A requested state at provisional-arrest stage cannot repeat a complete forensic audit. Complexity can reflect real crime; it can also conceal charge conversion, selective pursuit or inconsistent treatment.

Third, financial allegations naturally connect to asset measures. Location data can be paired with account freezing, mutual legal assistance, corporate investigation and enhanced bank due diligence. A target may defeat extradition yet accept return because the combined cost to assets, companies and relatives becomes unsustainable.

Fourth, Chinese anti-corruption has genuine legal and political dimensions. Punishing bribery and recovering public assets serve a legitimate public interest. At the same time, party discipline, elite promotion and factional conflict mean that some cases have political context. The foreign court's task is not to choose between 'real crime' and 'pure politics' as mutually exclusive categories, but to decide whether political factors predominate and whether transfer would expose the person to prohibited treatment.

5.3 Businessman H.: the strongest public evidence chain

Businessman H., a China-born Singapore citizen, was arrested in France in 2021 on a Chinese Red Notice alleging money laundering and misappropriation connected to the Tuandai platform. The Bordeaux appeal court refused extradition. ICIJ later reconstructed the case from French court records, communications and interviews. [8]

The material indicated that Chinese actors wanted H. to return and assist in the case of Sun Lijun, the former vice-minister of public security whose fall formed part of a politically sensitive security-sector purge. H.'s own financial allegations and the demand for assistance in the separate case became intertwined. His sister was arrested; business contacts, including a process involving Jack Ma, were engaged; and cooperation was linked to the possible withdrawal of pursuit or the Red Notice.

The significance is not a finding that H. was innocent of every financial allegation. It is the demonstrated conditional relationship: international policing pressure framed as an economic case increased the cost of refusing assistance in another political case. The French judicial refusal gives this conclusion a stronger basis than a unilateral allegation.

ICIJ's wider China Targets investigation interviewed 105 people in 23 countries who described targeting by Chinese authorities; about half reported that family members in China had been harassed, intimidated or questioned. The sample is not random and cannot estimate prevalence, but it shows that family, commercial and international-policing pressure recur across jurisdictions. [21]

5.4 Overtly political and ethnic cases

Dolkun Isa's Chinese Red Notice remained in the system for almost two decades and was deleted in 2018. During its lifetime it exposed him to detention, entry refusal and substantial travel restriction. Deletion did not adjudicate innocence; it showed that the data no longer met INTERPOL processing requirements and illustrated the damage possible before correction. [22]

Idris Hasan was arrested in Morocco in 2021. INTERPOL cancelled the notice and UN mechanisms raised non-refoulement concerns, yet the domestic extradition decision did not immediately disappear. He was released in 2025 after 43 months. The case shows a structural gap between international data review and national implementation.

5.5 Six leverage effects of weaponisation

Lever	Practical effect	Risk signal
Location	Identifies country, transit and identity information	Thin file paired with persistent tracking of a non-violent target
Immobilisation	Airport detention, visa review and avoided travel	Notice maintained without a timely complete extradition file
Reputation	Bank, employer and business-partner risk escalation	Public exposure used as punishment rather than necessity
Assets	Links freezing, assistance and associated-company inquiries	Financial measures exchanged for political information
Family	Questioning, exit bans, detention or property pressure	Relative treatment directly linked to return or testimony
Legitimacy	Creates an appearance of international endorsement	Notice described as international guilt finding

Freedom House has noted that governments can use notices to imply international validation even though INTERPOL performs no judicial merits review. Le Monde and ICIJ described the notice as immobilising a target so that additional tools can be applied. [23][24]

5.6 Seven indicators for identifying instrumental use

Reviewers should ask: (1) whether the requesting state demands evidence about another official, businessperson or political case; (2) whether return, testimony or silence can secure withdrawal of the notice or release of a relative; (3) whether relatives face measures disproportionate to their own conduct; (4) whether allegations and evidence shift without a clear predicate offence; (5) whether the person already holds refugee or protection status; (6) whether comparable actors are treated differently while a fallen faction or non-cooperator is pursued; and (7) whether official language stresses deterrence, loyalty or national security while avoiding material that can be tested in court.

No single indicator necessarily proves political purpose. Several mutually reinforcing indicators - particularly withdrawal-for-cooperation offers, family detention or unrelated testimony demands - justify a higher demand for primary evidence and independently monitorable safeguards.

5.7 Evidence grading

Evidence	Conclusion supported	Conclusion not supported
Chinese official lists and statistics	Economic and corruption cases are a sustained priority	Every listed allegation is true or false
Foreign judgments	Political purpose, weak evidence or rights risk in the individual case	Automatic extension to all Chinese requests
ICIJ cross-border investigation	Family and commercial pressure mechanisms recur	Population-wide prevalence from a non-random sample
CCF deletion	Continued INTERPOL processing no longer complied with rules	Acquittal or cancellation of the domestic case
Return figures	The system has location and return-inducement effects	Return was voluntary or constituted formal extradition

6. Europe: from case-specific doubt to structural distrust

6.1 The 2019 turning point

The Swedish Supreme Court's Qiao Jianjun decision examined torture, capital punishment, unfair trial and political-persecution risks and declined to rely on Chinese assurances. The Czech Constitutional Court then intervened in the case of eight Taiwanese men, emphasising that paper prohibitions and consular visits could not by themselves remove practical torture risk. French decisions combined general human-rights material with individual political context.

6.2 Liu v Poland changed the evidential structure

In October 2022 the European Court of Human Rights held that extraditing Hung Tao Liu to China would violate Article 3. It considered consistent and credible material describing torture and ill-treatment in Chinese detention facilities. The applicant did not have to prove a special personal characteristic once return would expose him to that general detention risk. [2]

The significance is systemic. Later Italian authority treated the reasoning as generally applicable even where the requested person was accused of ordinary crime and lacked an obvious political, religious or minority profile. The analytical burden shifted from asking only whether the individual was especially vulnerable to asking whether any proposed detention pathway reliably avoided the general risk.

6.3 Europe has raised the cooperation threshold, not ended cooperation

European states can still investigate Chinese evidence, freeze assets, prosecute domestically, share material or transfer to a rights-compliant jurisdiction. What has changed is the ability of general embassy assurances to overcome concerns about torture, concealed detention, trial independence and irreducible life sentences. Assurances must be specific, authorised, monitorable and consistent with practical capacity.

6.4 Europe remains internally uneven

The ECHR creates a common Article 3 floor, but domestic arrest rules, bail practice, treaty networks and prosecutorial approaches vary. States with deeper security relations with China may be more willing to cooperate politically. Even where final surrender is blocked, the person may still suffer airport arrest and years of proceedings.

7. The United States, Canada and Australia: caution with administrative gaps

7.1 United States

US Department of Justice guidance states that a foreign Red Notice alone cannot provide a domestic arrest basis. The United States and China have no bilateral extradition treaty, making traditional extradition difficult. [3]

The notice can nevertheless influence border and immigration decisions. Academic analysis has described removal based on contested notice data as disguised extradition because protection claims may be decided through immigration law rather than extradition safeguards. [15]

7.2 Canada

Lai Changxing's case involved prolonged refugee, immigration and non-refoulement proceedings rather than simple execution of a Chinese request. Canada ultimately removed him after accepting assurances including no death sentence. The case demonstrates that Western caution may delay transfer for years without excluding eventual administrative removal.

7.3 Australia

Australia and China signed an extradition treaty in 2007, but parliamentary concerns about capital punishment, torture, fair trial and monitoring led the government to withdraw the ratification motion in 2017. The treaty never entered into force. [11]

7.4 Conditional cooperation remains possible

Serious narcotics, child-protection, cybercrime or violence cases can still produce case-specific cooperation. It is more accurate to describe Western policy as conditional and fragmented than categorically non-cooperative.

8. Asia: strong administrative execution, limited judicial visibility

8.1 Removal is often more visible than formal extradition

Public cases from Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia include fraud suspects, immigration offenders and Uyghurs transferred through expulsion or removal. Administrative authorities may need to establish nationality or unlawful stay rather than test the full criminal file. In 2025 Cambodia again transferred a large group of fraud suspects, most of them Taiwanese, to China. [13]

8.2 Why cooperation may be higher

The reason is not simply Chinese pressure. Scam compounds, online gambling and trafficking create genuine local security and reputational costs. China is also an important source of investment, trade, tourists and security cooperation. In some states judicial review, refugee protection and non-governmental oversight are weaker, leaving greater executive discretion.

8.3 The Taiwan factor

Where the target is Taiwanese, recognition policy, access by Taiwan representative offices and acceptance of mainland jurisdiction directly affect destination. Transfer to the mainland becomes the criminal-law implementation of diplomatic recognition.

8.4 Uyghur cases expose implementation gaps in non-refoulement

Cambodia's 2009 return of 22 Uyghurs and Thailand's 2025 transfer of at least 40 long-detained Uyghur men attracted strong UN and human-rights criticism. [10][14] The difference from Europe lies less in the text of international law than in whether the individual can obtain a court order with suspensive effect before transfer.

8.5 Asia is not a single bloc

Turkish courts have refused Uyghur extradition and granted protection; New Zealand's Supreme Court subjected Chinese assurances to prolonged scrutiny in the Kyung Yup Kim litigation; Japan and South Korea have more developed judicial and refugee procedures. Judicial independence, treaty structure, protection remedies and security dependence predict outcomes better than geography alone.

9. Why diplomatic assurances increasingly fail in European courts

China may promise no death sentence, consular visits, no torture, a designated detention location or trial observation. Assurances are not automatically invalid, but reliability depends on the authority of the issuer, specificity, compatibility with domestic law, independent confidential monitoring and meaningful consequences for breach.

China-related concerns include whether an embassy or central administrative body can bind police, supervision commissions, procuratorates, courts, prisons and local authorities; whether residential surveillance at a designated location can bypass the promise; whether visits can detect hidden torture; and whether any independent body has continuous access to detention sites.

Liu v Poland further establishes that general promises cannot discharge the requested state's own non-refoulement obligation where extensive and mutually reinforcing material shows a continuing systemic risk.

10. Structural problems in the Red Notice system

10.1 Limited public data

The public INTERPOL website displays only a portion of notices. A requesting country may choose non-public circulation, and diffusions can transmit similar data. Absence from the website does not prove absence from police databases. Deletion from INTERPOL also does not prove immediate deletion from every national system.

10.2 CCF deletion cannot repair every consequence

A person may ask the CCF for access, correction or deletion on political-purpose, refugee-status, accuracy, proportionality or human-rights grounds. The CCF is an important remedy, but it does not decide the underlying criminal case or order national courts to cancel warrants, immigration decisions or extradition proceedings.

10.3 Ordinary economic offences are the hardest boundary

Expression or religion cases more obviously trigger Article 3. Corruption, fraud, laundering and misappropriation look like ordinary crimes. The request may be legitimate, selectively enforced or used to compel politically sensitive evidence. Review by label alone misses political predominance; treating every Chinese economic request as political would undermine genuine crime cooperation. Power relationships, charging selectivity, procedural anomalies, treatment of connected persons and non-criminal conditions must be assessed together.

11. A seven-variable model of national cooperation

Variable	Cooperation more likely	Cooperation less likely
Legal basis	Treaty in force; notice can support provisional arrest	No treaty; notice alone cannot authorise arrest
Judicial review	Executive-led; narrow court review	Independent court; full country and assurance review
Human-rights law	Non-refoulement weakly implemented domestically	ECHR/CAT and asylum remedies have suspensive effect
Case type	Violence, drugs, fraud and organised crime	Political, religious, ethnic, national-security or selective anti-corruption context
Status	No stable residence; failed protection claim	Citizen, permanent resident, refugee or protected person
Bilateral relations	High investment, security and diplomatic dependence	Strategic competition and strong parliamentary scrutiny
Alternative route	Visa cancellation, removal or police transfer available	Administrative measures also subject to court and non-refoulement review

The model explains why one file can produce different outcomes in different states and why a second passport does not remove the underlying risk. Nationality may change consular protection, entry rights or rules against extraditing citizens, but it does not delete INTERPOL data or prevent a third state from acting under its own law.

12. Future trends

First, European courts are likely to maintain substantial barriers to extradition to China unless verifiable detention reform, independent monitoring and specific safeguards address the systemic concerns recognised in Liu v Poland.

Second, China is likely to rely more heavily on tools beyond public Red Notices: diffusions, bilateral police liaison, third-country prosecution, immigration removal, anti-scam operations, asset measures and persuaded return. European extradition barriers may make the system more administrative and fragmented rather than less active.

Third, Southeast Asian cooperation against scam compounds, online gambling and trafficking will expand because the underlying harm is real. Disputes will focus on destination, capital punishment, Taiwanese jurisdiction and whether apparent offenders were themselves trafficked or compelled.

Fourth, Western states will increasingly place INTERPOL misuse within transnational-repression policy while preserving cooperation in serious ordinary crime. Effective screening should prevent a notice alone from becoming immigration punishment, enable rapid access to challenge mechanisms and address unauthorised overseas police pressure.

Fifth, reciprocity will continue to support selected transfers even without comprehensive treaties. Cooperation will be transactional and case-specific rather than founded on general institutional trust.

13. Conclusion: who controls the final mile?

Chinese Red Notices include legitimate cross-border criminal-enforcement needs and requests intertwined with anti-corruption politics, national security, ethnic governance or transnational repression. Origin in China cannot automatically invalidate a request; an ordinary label such as fraud, laundering or terrorism cannot establish that the case is apolitical.

The special investigation supports a sharper, evidence-bounded finding: China has a sustained and institutional preference for using Red Notices, particularly in corruption and economic cases. Economic charges travel easily, connect to assets and obscure political context. Businessman H. provides a judicially grounded example of an economic notice linked to unrelated political evidence demands, family pressure and conditional exchange. Dolkun Isa and Idris Hasan illustrate overt political and ethnic-risk cases.

The term weaponisation is therefore supported when confined to demonstrated misuse or dual use in particular cases. It should not be expanded into a collective judgment on every economic allegation. The necessary inquiry tests primary evidence, political background, identity, detention pathway, fair-trial risk, assurances, family pressure and alternative removal routes.

INTERPOL transmits information to the border; national institutions control the final mile. Europe has built powerful judicial blocking through courts and the ECHR. The United States, Canada and Australia use treaty structure, arrest law, immigration protection and political scrutiny to create conditional cooperation. In parts of Asia the executive controls the final mile, increasing speed while reducing transparency.

Final assessment: The legal effect of a Red Notice is limited, but the state and private systems it connects can be extremely powerful. The decisive questions are not simply whether a notice exists, but which state will act, under what domestic authority, with what effective remedy, and whether the requesting state can switch to an administrative route after extradition scrutiny fails.

Case index

Case	Jurisdiction	Outcome	Significance
Qiao Jianjun	Sweden	Supreme Court refused extradition	2019 European turning point; assurances rejected
Eight Taiwanese men	Czech Republic	Constitutional Court stopped extradition	Torture risk and unenforceable assurances
Businessman H.	France	Appeal court refused extradition	Economic allegation intertwined with political pressure
Li Zhihui	Poland	Appeal court refused extradition	Religion, punishment and assurances
Hung Tao Liu	Poland / ECtHR	Extradition would violate Article 3	General risk in Chinese detention
Idris Hasan	Morocco	Initially approved; released after 43 months	CCF deletion and national process diverged
Huang Haiyong	Peru	Physically extradited in 2016	Contested Latin American extradition
She Zhijiang	Thailand	Physically extradited in 2025	Formal Asian extradition and gambling enforcement
22 Uyghurs	Cambodia	Forcibly returned in 2009	Administrative transfer and non-refoulement risk
Lai Changxing	Canada	Removed in 2011	Long Western review ending in immigration removal

Research limitations

This report draws on 39 publicly verifiable cases or group events and the principal legal and institutional sources listed below. Most Red Notices are not public; some cases are anonymised; Asian administrative transfers often lack full judgments; and litigation failures may be over-represented. The report identifies patterns and does not estimate the true population success rate or guarantee any individual outcome. Criminal allegations are attributed to their public source and are not findings of guilt.

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Citation: China Rights Monitor, China's Red Notices, Extradition and Repatriation Requests: Legal Tools, State Motives, Regional Enforcement Differences and Outcome Patterns, CRM-RP-2026-012, version 1.0, 30 July 2026.