

Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance

Global Trends, Evidence Patterns and Accountability Pathways, 2016–2026

INSTITUTION	EVIDENCE CUT-OFF	VERSION
China Rights Monitor	28 July 2026	1.1 / Institutional

DOCUMENTING TRUTH. DEFENDING RIGHTS.

China Rights Monitor is an independent research and evidence platform.

This report records facts, assesses evidence and proposes institutional responses. “Alleged,” “documented,” “verified,” and “adjudicated” describe different levels of proof. Unless a finding has been made by a competent court or investigative body, an allegation must not be presented as a judicially established fact. The institutions cited in this report have not endorsed CRM or its conclusions.

Executive Summary

Over the past decade, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance have persisted despite an increasingly developed body of international law. They now operate through hybrid systems shaped by armed conflict, counter-terrorism, national-security law, migration control, transnational repression, and the penetration of public institutions by organised crime. The classic pattern—a person taken by security agents while the State denies any custody—remains widespread. Yet many contemporary cases follow another sequence: a person is secretly controlled and denied contact, then the detention is regularised through national-security, terrorism, public-order, “false information,” or immigration proceedings. A warrant or later trial does not automatically cure arbitrariness. Detention may remain arbitrary where no reviewable legal basis exists, where it punishes protected expression or association, or where fair-trial violations are exceptionally grave.

This report covers 1 January 2016 to 28 July 2026. CRM reviewed material from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN commissions of inquiry and field monitoring missions. It also considered information from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organisations that disclose their research methods, together with investigations and interviews published by Reuters, the Associated Press, the Financial Times and the Guardian. CRM did not conduct new interviews for this edition. Every interview statistic cited below comes from a publicly available investigation with an identifiable sample and methodology.

No responsible single “global total” can be produced from the available data. Mexico’s missing-person register, estimates for conflict-related disappearance in Syria, Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry caseload, UN monitoring of conflict-related detention in Ukraine, CED urgent-action requests and the WGEID case database measure different populations across different time periods and employ different evidential thresholds. Adding them would create false precision. This report treats each figure as a lower bound visible through a particular institutional window and labels its source, definition, date and case status.

The principal findings are:

1. **Official figures are generally floors, not estimates of true prevalence.** Fear of reporting, inaccessible conflict areas, inconsistent registries, duplicate or incomplete records, and official denial of custody exclude many cases.
2. **The early period of unacknowledged detention is the highest-risk window.** The hours, days or weeks between apprehension and first contact with a lawyer or family frequently coincide with torture, coerced confessions, forced access to devices and fabrication of a case file.
3. **National-security and counter-terrorism law are the leading vehicles for regularisation.** Vague offences, secret evidence, special courts, extended custody and restricted legal access can turn exceptional measures into routine governance.
4. **Armed conflict produces mass, cross-border and exceptionally difficult-to-verify disappearance.** Ukraine and Syria show how civilians, prisoners of war, medical workers, journalists and local officials may be moved across occupied territory or into another State.

5. **Disappearance is not always a simple State-versus-individual event.** Mexico demonstrates how organised crime, local police, military personnel, prosecutors and political networks may collude or fail to act.
6. **Lawyers, journalists, human-rights defenders and minorities face disproportionate risk.** Their detention often has a demonstrative purpose: punishing one person while warning an entire community.
7. **Family members are rights-holders and victims in their own right.** Uncertainty, impoverishment, stigma, reprisals and intergenerational trauma make disappearance a continuing violation.
8. **The central accountability gap is control of evidence.** Custody registers, transfer orders, surveillance, communications, forensic material and command records are often held by the same institutions implicated in the conduct.

1. Questions and Scope

This report asks four questions: What forms have arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance taken during the past decade? What exactly do different institutional datasets measure? What mechanisms emerge from public interviews and investigative reporting? What practical measures can courts, lawyers, human-rights institutions and policymakers adopt?

The study is not confined to long-term disappearance. Under international law, enforced disappearance may occur when State agents—or persons acting with State authorisation, support or acquiescence—deprive a person of liberty, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation or concealment of the person’s fate or whereabouts, placing that person outside the protection of law. Duration is not decisive. Secret detention lasting hours or days may meet the definition, particularly where it facilitates interrogation, torture or denial of judicial protection.

Arbitrary detention is broader. A detention recognised under domestic law may still be arbitrary because it lacks a substantive legal basis, punishes the exercise of protected rights, involves fair-trial violations of exceptional gravity, subjects a migrant or asylum seeker to indefinite administrative custody without periodic review, or is discriminatory. WGAD commonly analyses cases through five categories: absence of a legal basis; detention resulting from exercise of fundamental rights; grave fair-trial violations; prolonged administrative custody of migrants or asylum seekers without effective review; and discriminatory detention on grounds such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, political opinion, gender or disability.

CRM does not automatically classify every missing person, loss of contact or wartime person unaccounted for as forcibly disappeared. Without evidence of State conduct, authorisation, support or acquiescence, a case remains “missing” or “possible disappearance.” A single family account without independent corroboration is described as an allegation requiring investigation. This caution protects—not diminishes—the value of testimony by preserving the report’s utility in litigation, protection proceedings and policy work.

2. Legal Framework and Boundaries

Articles 3, 5, 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 6, 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protect life, liberty, freedom from torture and fair trial. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) further provides that no war, emergency or political instability may justify enforced disappearance. States must criminalise, investigate and prevent the practice, search for disappeared persons, protect complainants and relatives, and recognise rights to truth and reparation.

Article 7 of the Rome Statute identifies enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and with the required knowledge. That threshold is higher than proof of an individual violation. It requires evidence of the wider attack, a policy or

organisational context, and the perpetrator's knowledge. OHCHR's careful conclusion that certain Xinjiang practices "may constitute" international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity, illustrates the need to distinguish risk findings from a final criminal judgment.

"Unlawful" and "arbitrary" are not synonyms. Arbitrariness includes inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due-process failure. Domestic authorisation does not immunise detention from international review. Conversely, a minor procedural defect does not necessarily establish arbitrary detention; purpose, duration, access to judicial review and counsel, and the fairness of proceedings must be assessed together.

"Secret detention" describes a fact. "Enforced disappearance" is a legal characterisation with specific elements. Solitary confinement is not itself disappearance where custody is acknowledged and effective legal protection remains available. Enforced disappearance is also continuing in character: until the fate or whereabouts are clarified, limitation periods, preservation duties and family rights cannot simply run from the day of apprehension.

3. Research Design and Data Collection

3.1 Source Collection

CRM searched material covering 1 January 2016 to 28 July 2026 using English, Chinese and Spanish titles and institutional indexes. Sources were grouped as:

- **Tier A—authoritative primary material:** UN treaty bodies and special procedures, commissions of inquiry, field monitoring missions, international or domestic judgments, official registers, statutory inquiries and public ICRC material.
- **Tier B—methodologically transparent investigations:** reports by international or local human-rights organisations, academic programmes and forensic bodies that disclose interview samples, geographic scope, verification and limitations.
- **Tier C—traceable investigative journalism:** signed and dated reporting based on fieldwork or multiple interviews and linked, where possible, to primary documents.

Social media, anonymous compilations and reposts were treated as leads, not standalone confirmation. Official statements were important evidence but were not automatically superior merely because they were issued by a government. NGO estimates were likewise examined for methodology rather than accepted by reputation alone.

3.2 Unit of Analysis and Fields

The basic unit is the "person-detention event." Two detentions of one person at different times are two events. Ten reports of one detention are one event. Core fields include event ID, name or anonymised code, country and location, apprehension and release dates, detaining actor, asserted legal basis, acknowledgement of custody, first family or lawyer notification, transfers, torture allegations, source class, verification level, procedural outcome and current status.

Deduplication used names, aliases, dates, locations, agencies, family relationships and case numbers. Collective incidents were split into individual records only where a credible list existed. Vague expressions such as "dozens" were retained as event descriptions rather than converted into invented exact figures.

3.3 Evidence Levels

The report uses four working levels. E1 indicates a judgment, formal UN opinion or finding by a body with a defined investigative mandate. E2 indicates corroboration by at least two independent reliable sources. E3 indicates one

methodologically transparent professional source or a major multi-source media investigation. E4 indicates a single account or unverified lead. E4 material is not used to infer prevalence.

3.4 Interview Evidence

CRM conducted no direct interviews in this edition. Public interview datasets are used only within their stated limits. OHCHR's March 2024 update interviewed 60 recently released Ukrainian prisoners of war; almost all described torture and more than half reported sexual violence. A 2025 OHCHR report on conflict-related civilian detention drew on interviews with 215 released civilians. A 2023 release included 127 persons freed from Russian-controlled detention, approximately 90 per cent of whom reported torture or ill-treatment. These samples establish recurring patterns among interviewees, but they are not population surveys.

3.5 Limitations

The study faces survivor bias, denial of access, deaths in custody, continued secret detention, duplicate names, inconsistent transliteration, mixed historic and recent records, urban and celebrity bias in media coverage, strategic disclosure by governments and advocacy organisations, and language constraints. Public-source research cannot replace criminal investigation, compelled disclosure or forensic examination.

4. The Global Data Picture

The three central UN mechanisms perform different tasks. WGAD issues legal opinions on individual complaints; the number of opinions is not a prevalence count. WGEID operates a humanitarian procedure to help families clarify fate or whereabouts and retains long-running unresolved cases; its database is not a census. CED reviews State reports, communications and urgent actions. Its caseload depends on treaty participation, recognition of competence, legal assistance and the ability to file a case.

By 27 February 2024, CED had registered 1,770 urgent-action requests, including 1,722 original requests. This shows use of an international protection mechanism, not the global number of disappearances. WGEID's 2023 report listed 1,862 outstanding cases in five European countries, while 1,721 Ukraine-related cases had been transmitted under its humanitarian procedure during the same reporting period. Their geography, procedure and chronology differ; they cannot be added and labelled a European total.

National registries are equally non-comparable. Mexico's register spans periods and alleged perpetrators and includes criminal disappearance as well as cases with potential State involvement. Pakistan's Commission of Inquiry reported 10,014 complaints through 2023, with 6,276 disposed of or traced and 2,265 pending; outcomes included return, internment, prison, death and cases outside its remit. Syria's figure of more than 100,000 missing or disappeared is an aggregate conflict estimate without a single public, name-by-name judicial register.

The figures in this report are therefore read together with the population counted, dates covered, source institution and case status. Figures lacking those qualifications do not provide a reliable basis for cross-country comparison.

5. Country and Regional Case Studies

5.1 Syria: The Opening of Prisons Did Not Automatically Produce Truth

Syria remains one of the gravest disappearance contexts of the decade. UN bodies, international organisations and media have documented detention, abduction, torture and execution by security agencies, armed forces, armed groups and the Islamic State group. Rights organisations commonly estimate that at least 100,000—and in some

compilations around 150,000—people have disappeared since 2011. These are list-based estimates, not 150,000 judicially adjudicated cases.

After the fall of the Assad government in late 2024, detention sites opened and families searched prisons. Yet the assumption that all disappeared persons would simply walk free was quickly disproved. Many families found no trace. Paper files, drives, CCTV systems and human remains risked destruction, dispersal or handling without forensic controls. Interviews with relatives recorded both renewed hope and secondary trauma as families attempted to identify clothing, photographs and documents without adequate professional support.

Syria established a National Commission for Missing Persons in May 2025. Its credibility will depend on independence, victim participation, equal treatment of abuses by all actors and disciplined chain-of-custody practice. Reuters reported that OHCHR had recorded 97 new abductions or disappearances from January 2025, demonstrating that political transition alone does not end the method.

Syria should prioritise preservation of detention archives, an auditable unified register, internationally compliant protection of mass graves and formal family representation in institutional governance.

5.2 Mexico: Criminal Networks, State Failure and Disputed Data

Mexico shows why disappearance is not always centrally commanded. Local police, soldiers, prosecutors or officials may participate directly, support criminal groups or acquiesce in known risks; other cases may be committed solely by private criminals. Classification remains case-specific, but the State has positive duties to prevent, search, investigate and protect families.

ICRC reported that Mexico's registered total passed 100,000 in 2022. CED cited official data showing an increase from 95,121 in March 2022 to 129,341 on 17 June 2025 and expressed grave concern about widespread disappearance and impunity. The register makes the crisis visible, but it has faced incomplete records, duplicate entries, inconsistent updating and divergent state-level practices.

In March 2026, Reuters reported that government cross-checking of roughly 130,000 records suggested around 40,000 registered persons might be alive. Authorities had located and reclassified 5,269 people; some 46,000 entries lacked essential data, and 43,128 showed no activity in other systems. The episode should not be reduced either to “the crisis was exaggerated” or “the State erased victims.” It shows why an auditable register must separate located, possibly alive, data-deficient, confirmed dead and still missing. Data cleaning cannot close criminal investigations by itself.

Reporting on a suspected site in Jalisco, where large quantities of clothing, human remains and possible burning facilities were found, also exposed the degree to which family collectives often drive searches and official scene protection may be delayed.

Mexico requires consistent national data fields, independent auditing, cross-state case identifiers, interoperability between missing-person and unidentified-remains records, and formal integration of family-generated evidence into a protected chain of custody.

5.3 Ukraine: Occupation, Cross-Border Transfer and Fragmented Custody

Since Russia's full-scale invasion, the UN has recorded widespread allegations of detention, secret transfer, disappearance, torture and execution of civilians and prisoners of war. A 2022 OHCHR report documented 407 cases attributed to Russian forces and affiliated groups, with 18 victims later found dead. It also recorded 47 arbitrary detention cases and 31 possible enforced disappearances attributed to Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies. Credible monitoring applies the same legal standards to all parties.

In 2023, OHCHR reported 621 cases attributed to Russian forces. Of 127 released detainees interviewed, approximately 90 per cent reported torture or ill-treatment. In March 2024, OHCHR interviewed 60 recently

released Ukrainian prisoners of war; almost all described torture and more than half reported sexual violence. It recorded allegations concerning 32 executions in 12 incidents and had independently verified three. “Three verified” and “32 alleged” must be presented together.

OHCHR’s 2025 civilian-detention report relied on interviews with 215 released civilians and identified widespread, systematic torture and ill-treatment. Ukraine stated in May 2025 that about 1,800 civilians remained in Russian custody; OHCHR considered the number likely to be a substantial underestimate. OHCHR also continued to report allegations concerning persons held by Ukraine and cited official figures of 2,258 conflict-related detainees and approximately 20,000 open cases as of 21 July 2025.

Cross-border transfer fragments the evidence chain among local police, armed forces, occupation authorities, the Russian prison system and exchange mechanisms. Families may receive an unofficial call, testimony from another detainee or video without formal confirmation.

Every transfer, exchange and release should generate a durable custody trail. International access mechanisms must be able to verify identity, place, health and transfer authority. Peace negotiations must not result in the loss of individual records.

5.4 China Focus: Institutionalised Secret Custody and “Disappear First, Legalise Later”

China is a central focus of this report. Risk is not concentrated in a single system openly called “enforced disappearance.” It is distributed across criminal justice, national-security investigations, supervision detention, administrative measures and informal controls. A recurring structure is that an authority first obtains actual control over a person while family and counsel cannot verify the true location, legal basis or health. The person may later re-enter formal records as subject to RSDL, criminal detention, arrest, liuzhi or another measure. Looking only at the eventual document misses the period in which torture, coercion and evidential contamination are most likely.

5.4.1 RSDL: Domestic Authorisation Does Not Resolve International Legality

Article 75 of China’s 2018 Criminal Procedure Law permits Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location in specified circumstances, including certain national-security and terrorism cases. The law provides, in principle, for family notification within 24 hours and procuratorial supervision. The measure may last up to six months, while meetings, communications and movement remain controlled by the executing authority.

The question is not whether a statutory provision exists, but whether it prevents a person from being placed outside legal protection. Reported concerns include notices that do not disclose the real address, denial of counsel in security cases, use of locations outside the ordinary detention-centre system, and review that is neither public nor effectively contestable before an independent court. A State may acknowledge the name of a measure yet still create enforced-disappearance risk if it conceals the actual place and blocks an effective remedy.

UN special procedures recorded that Ding Jiayi, Zhang Zhongshun and Dai Zhenya were taken from different locations in December 2019 and placed in RSDL, describing allegations of arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance. WGAD Opinion No. 59/2017 concerning Hu Shigen, Xie Yang and Zhou Shifeng also examined detention, access to lawyers and fair trial. These procedures are not a judgment on every Chinese criminal case; they illustrate why international review distinguishes domestic form from practical protection.

Safeguard Defenders estimated from judgments once available on China Judgments Online that at least approximately 28,000–29,000 people had been placed in RSDL between 2013 and the end of 2019. This is not an official national total or a UN-confirmed victim count. Its dataset captures cases that later produced a published judgment and may omit non-prosecution, withdrawal, unpublished decisions and deleted documents; keyword selection and deduplication create additional uncertainty. Read together with judgments, testimony, UN communications and statutory texts, the estimate indicates a scale of use and associated human-rights risk requiring continuing independent scrutiny.

5.4.2 Liuzhi: A Second Channel of Incommunicado Risk

The 2018 Supervision Law created the National Supervision Commission system and replaced earlier disciplinary measures with liuzhi. Its reach is not limited to Communist Party members and may cover a wide range of persons exercising public power. Unlike ordinary criminal detention, liuzhi runs through the supervision-investigation track, and ordinary access to defence counsel is not available during that stage in the same manner as in criminal proceedings.

Safeguard Defenders' analysis of published Central Commission for Discipline Inspection data states that approximately 26,000 people were placed in liuzhi in 2023 and 38,000 in 2024, an increase of about 46.15 per cent. These are an NGO's organisation and interpretation of official annual figures, not a UN finding that all such persons were forcibly disappeared. Legal classification remains individual: Was custody acknowledged? Could family obtain the real whereabouts? Did the person have access to effective legal protection? Was fate or location concealed?

RSDL and liuzhi have different legal character and controlling authorities and should not be collapsed into one system. From a human-rights perspective, however, both permit prolonged control outside ordinary detention centres at a stage when independent lawyers have the least access. Both require immediate registration, accurate location notice, independent medical examination, legal assistance and judicial review. Internal approval cannot fully replace an independent remedy.

5.4.3 Xinjiang: From Individual Secret Custody to Group-Based Arbitrary Detention

Xinjiang goes beyond the classic individual disappearance case. OHCHR's 2022 assessment used official documents, law and policy, public material and interviews and concluded that the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups, in the wider context of restrictions on fundamental rights, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity. It also recorded allegations of torture or ill-treatment, sexual violence, family separation and restrictions on religious and cultural rights.

OHCHR's interviews were not a random population survey. The proportion of interviewees reporting abuse cannot be extrapolated to every detainee. The Guardian's summary stated that roughly two-thirds of former detainees interviewed by OHCHR described treatment potentially amounting to torture or ill-treatment; this must be labelled as a proportion within the interview sample. China rejected the allegations, describing facilities as lawful vocational education and counter-extremism measures and submitting an annexed response to OHCHR.

CRM's assessment rests on three testable questions rather than either side's political characterisation: Was entry genuinely voluntary? Could a person rapidly challenge the restriction before an independent court? Were the standards for release, transfer to prison or continuing controls public and reviewable? If not, the labels "training," "education" or "prevention" cannot exclude arbitrary detention. If families also lacked knowledge of custody, place or fate, the elements of enforced disappearance require examination.

5.4.4 Lawyers, Defenders and Continuing Risk after the "709" Crackdown

Since the 2015 "709" crackdown, human-rights lawyers, legal workers, religious adherents, citizen journalists and activists have remained high-risk groups in security and public-order cases. Detaining a rights representative harms both the individual and the community that depends on legal assistance. Once a lawyer disappears, other lawyers may fear taking the case; family notices may be incomplete; proceedings may be closed on State-secrets grounds. Isolation of the representative then deprives others of representation and makes verification more difficult.

Not every interruption in communication is automatically enforced disappearance. A reliable assessment reconstructs five points: the last confirmed moment at liberty; the authority exercising actual control; the first State acknowledgement; the first time the family knew the real location; and the first confidential lawyer meeting. That chronology separates ordinary communication restriction, arbitrary detention, secret detention and possible enforced disappearance.

5.4.5 Multiple Tracks: Criminal Judgments Are Not a Complete Dataset

Beyond RSDL and liuzhi, deprivation of liberty may occur through administrative detention, compulsory drug treatment, psychiatric measures, immigration detention, “legal education,” or informal house arrest. Different institutions manage each track, and data, remedies and record-keeping are not unified. Research limited to criminal judgments systematically excludes persons who never reach a criminal court.

Contraction of judicial transparency makes verification harder. Comparing searches of China Judgments Online at different dates, Safeguard Defenders reported that approximately 86,518 first-instance criminal judgments from 2013–2020 were no longer visible, including 692 mentioning RSDL. Removal does not prove that a case was unlawful and may reflect privacy, migration or publication-policy changes. But large-scale disappearance of documents without a reproducible change log undermines external audit and prevents researchers and lawyers from replicating historical counts.

CRM therefore applies a source-freezing protocol for China: record the query date, search terms, result count and file hash; preserve original copies of judgments later removed; and disclose models, coverage and uncertainty for estimates. China cannot responsibly be described by one total. RSDL, liuzhi, ordinary criminal custody, administrative measures, Xinjiang mass detention and unconfirmed missing-person leads should be reported separately.

5.4.6 Institutional Assessment

The central risk is not a total absence of procedure but concentration of its decisive elements within the same chain of authority. The body imposing the measure controls location, access, health information, notification and records; an external court may be unable to intervene during the secret stage. “Acknowledgement of a measure” and “effective protection of the person” are therefore not equivalent.

Reform priorities include ending custody without disclosure of the real location; independent counsel from the first moment of actual control; interoperable, tamper-resistant registration of every custody and transfer; immediate judicial review of place and legal basis; unannounced independent visits; strict exclusion of statements obtained during secret custody; publication of anonymised statistics; and protection of families, lawyers and whistleblowers against retaliation.

5.5 Pakistan: Commission Statistics and Unresolved Accountability

Pakistan’s long-running controversy is particularly acute in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and areas affected by security operations, and includes students, political activists, journalists and human-rights defenders. UN-filed information citing the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances recorded 10,014 complaints through 2023, 6,276 disposed of or traced and 2,265 pending, with outcomes including return, internment, prison, death and cases outside jurisdiction.

These figures demonstrate recognition and case-processing, but “disposed” does not mean accountability. Finding someone in prison answers where the person is; it does not establish who took them, under what authority, why custody went unregistered, whether abuse occurred, or who should be prosecuted.

UN special procedures have also recorded allegations of restrictions and harassment targeting relatives and campaigners. Reprisals degrade data quality: the greater the reporting risk, the lower the official count and the wider the gap from prevalence.

Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry should publish anonymised annual data on receipt, tracing, closure, reopening and pending status; use separate indicators for “person located” and “responsibility investigated”; and impose enforceable duties on military, police and intelligence agencies to file custody records promptly.

5.6 Myanmar: Arbitrary Custody after the Coup

After the February 2021 military coup, the UN documented killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearance and prosecution of opponents. Detainees include elected officials, protesters, journalists, health workers, lawyers and ordinary social-media users. A 2025 UN special-procedures communication stated that at least 221 journalists or former journalists had been arrested, detained or subjected to acts tantamount to enforced disappearance since the coup, with at least 51 still detained at the time.

Internet shutdowns, military courts, blocked family access and prison transfers make verification exceptionally difficult. Local prisons, bases and interrogation sites may not use a common register. Exiled media and citizen networks provide vital leads, but lists require deduplication against court files, release records and family confirmation.

Myanmar-related statistics should distinguish political-prisoner registers, conflict-related custody, disappearance allegations and confirmed deaths. International mechanisms should preserve orders, prison rosters and digital evidence for future domestic, international or universal-jurisdiction proceedings.

5.7 Egypt: Short-Term Disappearance and Recycling of Detention

Egypt illustrates how short-term disappearance may precede a formal prosecution. In 2024, UN special procedures wrote concerning five citizens allegedly detained arbitrarily and prosecuted on terrorism charges after commenting on the economy on social media. In another case, independent-news cartoonist Ashraf Omar was allegedly disappeared for 48 hours before entering formal custody. Special procedures also raised the alleged warrantless arrest and continuing disappearance of defender Ahmed Mohamed Hamza.

“Recycling” describes the filing of a new, similar case when release is ordered or a detention period expires, neutralising judicial release. Even if each cycle has paperwork, the whole sequence may be arbitrary where it circumvents review, punishes expression and extends custody indefinitely.

Courts should examine the first moment of actual control, not merely the date on a prosecution form. Unexplained gaps between apprehension and registration should trigger independent investigation, medical examination and possible exclusion of evidence.

5.8 DPRK: Long-Term Cases and Intergenerational Rights

DPRK-related disappearance includes cross-border abduction, unresolved wartime cases and internal political detention. OHCHR’s Seoul office reported that by May 2021 WGEID had transmitted 330 cases to the DPRK and none had been clarified. The Republic of Korea recognises 516 post-war abductees who had not returned; Japan continues to list 12 officially recognised abductees as unaccounted for. The Korean War produced a much larger missing population, but identity verification, diplomacy and historical records remain fragmented.

The cases demonstrate continuing violation across generations. Families retain rights to truth, recovery of remains and effective remedy decades later. Humanitarian clarification should not be made wholly conditional on diplomatic bargaining.

6. Cross-Cutting Mechanisms

6.1 Disappearance Followed by Legalisation

More governments now conceal custody during the decisive interrogation period and later issue a notice. Public and judicial attention then shifts to the formal case and overlooks the unacknowledged interval. Analysis must reconstruct control minute by minute, hour by hour and day by day.

6.2 Elastic National-Security Offences

Security, terrorism, separatism, espionage, false-information and incitement offences are not inherently unlawful. They become vehicles for arbitrary detention where definitions are overbroad, evidence is secret, counsel cannot inspect the file and adjudication is not independent. WGAD Categories II and III allow purpose and procedural gravity to be analysed separately.

6.3 Fragmented Places of Detention

Military bases, police stations, immigration centres, intelligence safe houses, medical or treatment institutions, screening sites, private premises and foreign prisons form a layered system. A central register limited to Ministry of Justice prisons systematically omits actual custody.

6.4 Digital Control and Pressure on Families

Detainees' phones, cloud accounts and social graphs may facilitate wider arrests. Families can be pressured to remain silent, delete posts or persuade relatives abroad to stop advocacy. Digital traces are both evidence and risk; collection requires consent, data minimisation and encrypted storage.

6.5 The Impunity Feedback Loop

Disappearance conceals its own proof. The implicated institution often controls entry logs, video, vehicles and personnel. Without prosecutorial independence, a case may be closed because State custody "cannot be confirmed." Failure to prosecute then signals low risk to future perpetrators.

7. Evidential Weight of Public Sources and Interview Material

In inaccessible settings, investigative reporting and published interviews can identify cases, reconstruct timelines and test official accounts. Their evidential weight depends on the number and independence of sources, interview conditions, access to original material and subsequent verification. Reuters' reporting on Mexico's register identified data gaps but could not determine each person's fate. Financial Times reporting on a suspected Jalisco site exposed scene-management concerns, while identification of remains and the criminal chain still required forensic confirmation. The Guardian's interview with Syrian campaigner Wafa Mustafa supported findings concerning family impact and preservation demands but could not independently establish her father's fate.

Interview figures must be evaluated with their sample descriptions. OHCHR's 60 prisoners of war, 127 released detainees and 215 released civilians came from different dates and populations and cannot be combined into a single torture rate. Released persons can testify, while those killed, still hidden or inaccessible are absent from the samples. The interviews support findings of recurring methods—including beatings, electric shocks, sexual violence, mock executions, stress positions, denial of care and threats against family members—but do not establish prevalence across the entire detained population.

Public sources also display visibility bias. Well-known lawyers, journalists and activists receive international attention, while undocumented migrants, rural youth, minority women and poor families may appear only in relatives' lists or local registers. Limited reporting therefore cannot, without more, support an inference of lower risk.

8. Consequences for Victims, Families and Society

Enforced disappearance harms through uncertainty. Families cannot know whether a relative is alive, complete property or guardianship procedures, obtain benefits or register a death. Search costs can impoverish a household.

Mothers, wives and sisters often lead searches and face gendered threats. Children may lose support and identity documents and experience anxiety, stigma and interrupted education.

Secret detention undermines lawyers and courts. If police can place a person outside the register, counsel cannot activate remedies. If courts do not ask when actual control began, safeguards become ceremonial. Disappearance of journalists and organisers produces a chilling effect: authorities need not detain everyone if a few people vanish and the rest understand the warning.

The right to truth includes more than confirmation of death or location. It includes reasons, responsible institutions, the search performed and guarantees of non-repetition. Returning remains without explaining responsibility is not complete reparation.

9. Evidential Standards, Preservation and Litigation Use

Proof of arbitrary detention or enforced disappearance commonly depends on a continuous chronology, traceable provenance and integrity of the materials. A case file considered by lawyers, courts or investigative authorities should preserve:

- the last confirmed time and place at liberty and the witness;
- uniforms, vehicles, accents, unit insignia and method of apprehension;
- original complaints, enquiries, legal applications and proof of service;
- read-only copies and hashes of calls, location records, video and photographs;
- injury photographs, medical records and an independent examination soon after release;
- cellmate testimony and the basis of the witness's knowledge;
- transfer, release, exchange or death notices;
- threats, surveillance or reprisals against relatives.

Original digital files should be retained, not only screenshots. Each copy should record time, operator and hash. Public disclosure requires a risk assessment, removal of exact addresses and identifying metadata, and protection of minors and witnesses. Original evidence, working copies, translations and public-redacted versions should be stored separately.

In asylum and human-rights protection proceedings, individual evidence should be connected to reliable country information. The absence of an official notice may itself be consistent with secret custody and should not automatically defeat credibility. The account must still be tested for temporal coherence, detail, consistency with external patterns and the effects of trauma.

10. Recommendations

To Governments

1. Criminalise enforced disappearance fully and exclude superior orders as a defence.
2. Create a real-time register covering every place of actual custody and make it lawfully accessible to families, counsel, courts and independent monitors.
3. Guarantee counsel, medical examination and family notification from the beginning of deprivation of liberty; any exception must be brief, written, necessary and judicially reviewed.

4. Establish enforceable habeas corpus. Courts should be able to inspect premises and draw adverse inferences where agencies refuse records.
5. Protect whistleblowers, lawyers, journalists, relatives and search groups and investigate retaliation.
6. Permit unannounced independent visits to police, military, intelligence, immigration and other actual detention sites.
7. Preserve CCTV, access logs, vehicle data, communications and command records immediately.

To the United Nations and International Organisations

1. Promote ratification of ICCPED and recognition of CED's individual and inter-State communication competence.
2. Harmonise minimum data fields without collapsing different mechanisms into a contextless total.
3. Provide sustained funding for family groups, forensic institutions and local investigators.
4. Include secret-detention and disappearance risk in sanctions, peace agreements, return, extradition and security cooperation.
5. Develop post-conflict evidence custody and transfer standards.

To Media and Research Organisations

1. State the source, population, time period, historical coverage and meaning of "pending" for every figure.
2. Separate allegation, independent verification, institutional finding and judicial judgment.
3. Withhold information that may endanger detainees or families and avoid extractive trauma interviewing.
4. Publish corrections and version histories. Preserve former states when databases are updated.

To Courts, Lawyers and Protection Decision-Makers

1. Determine when actual control began, not only the formal arrest date.
2. Apply strict exclusion to statements obtained during secret custody.
3. Give weight to methodologically transparent, corroborated country evidence; do not allow a bare government denial to displace a consistent pattern.
4. In extradition and persecution-risk proceedings, examine the real risk of secret detention, torture, disappearance and absence of effective judicial remedies.
5. Enable anonymous or remote testimony and secure evidence submission where necessary.

11. CRM Conclusions

The most important change of the past decade is not that disappearance has become "open," but that it is increasingly embedded in procedures that appear lawful. A person disappears during the decisive stage and later reappears in a formal file; or the State acknowledges a category of custody while concealing the true location, actor or remedy. Institutional legality must be tested by asking who can see the detainee, when they can do so, who can order release, who preserves evidence and who is accountable for concealment.

Fragmented global data are themselves a finding. The absence of a reliable world total does not make measurement impossible. It requires honest indicators: unresolved cases, urgent actions, verified incidents, registered missing persons, released-detainee interviews, detention sites and accountability outcomes reported

separately. Combining incompatible figures for an alarming headline undermines the later evidential value of victims' cases.

“Immediate visibility” is a central preventive safeguard. Every deprivation of liberty must promptly enter an independently accessible register; family and counsel must be able to confirm it; courts must be able to inspect every site; and transfer and surveillance records must not remain under the sole control of the implicated body. So long as an institution can make a person temporarily invisible, the structural risk of torture, coercion and fabricated evidence remains.

Finally, disappearance must not become a selective diplomatic slogan. Allies and adversaries require the same definitions and evidential thresholds. Monitoring must cover direct State conduct and State authorisation, support or acquiescence in private crime. It must protect prominent dissidents and unnamed migrants, rural families and ordinary civilians alike. Independence does not mean the absence of values; it means that factual standards do not change with the political identity of the alleged perpetrator.

China-Focused Conclusion

For China, the report’s most important conclusion is that risk cannot be identified merely by compiling a list of “missing persons.” Analysis must examine how RSDL, liuzhi, Xinjiang detention, administrative measures and informal controls connect. The decisive questions are not the official label but whether the State can promptly confirm identity and location, whether independent lawyers and medical professionals have access, whether a court can order release, whether family members receive truthful information, and whether evidence produced during the secret stage can be challenged.

The most dangerous component is an invisible period capable of being covered later by a legal name. A person’s eventual arrest notice, trial appearance or release does not retrospectively legalise days or months of unacknowledged control. Each case requires segmented analysis: actual apprehension, secret stage, formal registration, pre-trial detention, trial and post-release restriction. Concealment of location, obstruction of remedies or denial of control requires investigation even where the period was short.

RSDL and liuzhi estimates derived by Safeguard Defenders and others from judgments and official annual data are important warning indicators, but they are not UN-confirmed victim totals. Chinese statutes, notices and official responses form part of the evidential record, but they cannot substitute for independent verification of actual location, access to legal protection and individual outcomes. Corroboration among official rules, preserved judgments, UN communications, testimony, lawyer records and detailed custody timelines provides a more stable evidential foundation.

China-related cases require traceable, case-level custody chronologies and continuing independent monitoring of RSDL, liuzhi, Xinjiang detention and disappearance of human-rights lawyers. Changes in law, public statistics, judgment availability and new case material should be preserved regularly so that reproducible bilingual evidence remains available for asylum, extradition and persecution-risk proceedings, expert evidence and international accountability.

Appendix A: Selected Data Points

Context or mechanism	Published figure	What it measures	Principal limitation
CED urgent actions	1,770 by 27 Feb 2024	1,722 original requests	Only cases reaching the treaty mechanism
WGEID outstanding cases in Europe	1,862 in the May 2022–May 2023 reporting period	Outstanding cases in five countries	Includes historic cases; not annual incidence

Ukraine-related WGEID humanitarian cases	1,721 in the same period	Cases transmitted in relation to Russian forces	Not additive with other registers
Mexico registered missing	129,341 on 17 Jun 2025	National official register	Multiple periods and actors; ongoing data audit
Pakistan Commission of Inquiry	10,014 through 2023	6,276 disposed/traced; 2,265 pending	"Disposed" does not establish accountability
Ukraine OHCHR 2022	407 attributed to Russian forces; 47 arbitrary detentions and 31 possible disappearances attributed to Ukrainian bodies	Monitored incidents	Access and verification constraints
Ukraine OHCHR 2023	621 attributed to Russian forces	127 releasee interviews; about 90% alleged abuse	Releasee sample not population-representative
Syria	More than 100,000; some compilations around 150,000	Multi-actor conflict estimate since 2011	No unified adjudicated name-by-name register
DPRK/WGEID	330 cases transmitted and unclarified by May 2021	UN humanitarian case procedure	Not all historical missing persons

Appendix B: Sources and References

- OHCHR, *The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Fact Sheet No. 26 (Rev.1)*, 2024.
<https://searchlibrary.ohchr.org/record/31932>
- UN Human Rights Council, *Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention*, A/HRC/60/26, 2025.
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4087042>
- OHCHR, WGAD Opinions Database. <https://wgad-opinions.ohchr.org/>
- International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-all-persons-enforced>
- OHCHR, CED annual reports database, including A/80/56, A/79/56 and A/78/56.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx?DocTypeID=27&Lang=en&TreatyID=2
- OHCHR Europe, "Sharing experiences and providing input to the World Congress against Enforced Disappearances," 2024. <https://europe.ohchr.org/resources/speeches/sharing-experiences-and-providing-input-world-congress>
- OHCHR, *Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region*, 31 August 2022.
<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf>
- Government of China, annexed response to the OHCHR Xinjiang assessment, 2022.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX_A.pdf
- OHCHR Special Procedures, communication concerning Ding Jiaxi, Zhang Zhongshun and Dai Zhenya.
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/SummaryPrint?id=25106>
- OHCHR Ukraine, "UN Says Russia Continues to Torture, Execute Ukrainian POWs," 26 March 2024.
<https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/UN-Says-Russia-Continues-to-Torture-Execute-Ukrainian-POWs-UA>

11. OHCHR Ukraine, *Treatment of Civilians Deprived of Their Liberty*, 2025.
<https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/treatment-of-civilians-deprived-of-their-liberty-in-the-context-of-the-armed-attack-by-the-russian-federation-against-Ukraine>
12. OHCHR Ukraine, reporting on arbitrary detention and disappearance, 2022. <https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/un-human-rights-reports-dire-human-rights-situation-seven-months-after-start-russian-UA>
13. OHCHR Ukraine, reports on prisoners of war and the overall human-rights situation, 2023.
<https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/UN-Human-Rights-Ukraine-released-reports-on-treatment-of-prisoners-of-war-and-overall-human-rights-situation-in-Ukraine>
14. ICRC, “Mexico: 100,000 missing persons highlights need to strengthen existing search mechanisms,” 17 May 2022. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/mexico-100000-missing-persons-highlights-need-strengthen-existing-search-mechanisms>
15. UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Mexico procedure materials, 2025.
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ced>
16. Reuters, reporting on Mexico’s cross-check of the national missing-person register, 27 March 2026.
17. Financial Times, reporting on the suspected Jalisco site, 2025.
18. UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, reports archive. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/co-i-syria>
19. The Guardian, interview with Wafa Mustafa, 28 January 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jan/28/missing-wafa-mustafa-father-assad-prisons-syria>
20. Reuters, reporting on new abductions and disappearances in Syria during 2025, 7 November 2025.
21. Pakistan, Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances statistics submitted in UN reporting, through 2023. <https://docstore.ohchr.org/>
22. OHCHR, WGEID mission report concerning Pakistan. <https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/document/355b0c12-d91f-4c51-8475-994f15773b44>
23. OHCHR Special Procedures, Egypt communications EGY 2/2024, EGY 3/2024 and EGY 5/2024.
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/>
24. OHCHR Special Procedures, Ahmed Mohamed Hamza Mohamed Hamza communication, 2024.
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/SummaryPrint?id=29822>
25. OHCHR Special Procedures, communication concerning journalists in Myanmar, 2025.
<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/SummaryPrint?id=30082>
26. OHCHR Bangkok, Myanmar reports archive. <https://bangkok.ohchr.org/reports/2023-ohchr-report-human-rights-councils-52nd-session>
27. OHCHR Seoul, “Enforced Disappearance and Abductions,” DPRK data.
<https://seoul.ohchr.org/index.php/en/node/263>
28. Human Rights Watch, “China: New UN Report Alleges Crimes Against Humanity,” 1 September 2022.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/01/china-new-un-report-alleges-crimes-against-humanity>
29. Amnesty International, “China: Long-delayed UN report must spur accountability,” 1 September 2022.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/china-long-delayed-un-report-must-spur-accountability-for-crimes-against-humanity-in-xinjiang/>

30. The Guardian, “Five key points from the UN report on Xinjiang,” 1 September 2022.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/01/five-key-points-from-the-un-report-on-xinjiang-china-human-rights-abuses-uyghur-muslims>
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7.
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Rome-Statute.pdf>
32. UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, A/RES/47/133. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-protection-all-persons-enforced-disappearance>
33. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules).
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf
34. Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2018), arts. 75–77, English translation hosted by CECC. <https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china>
35. UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 59/2017 concerning Hu Shigen, Xie Yang and Zhou Shifeng, A/HRC/WGAD/2017/59. https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=30480
36. Safeguard Defenders, “Rampant Repression: Up to 30,000 disappeared in China’s RSDL jails since 2013”, 2020.
<https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/rampant-repression-30000-disappeared-chinas-rsdl-jails-2013>
37. Safeguard Defenders, “Liuzhi: Use of Party’s secret detention system soars,” 3 March 2025.
<https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/liuzhi-use-partys-secret-detention-system-soars>
38. Safeguard Defenders, “China’s judiciary 2022,” 24 July 2023.
<https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/prosecutions-abandoned-conviction-rate-record-high-and-more-chinas-judiciary-2022>

Legal Status and Limitations on Use

This report is a public-source research product for policy assessment, legal background research, fact-checking and human-rights education. Before use in litigation, an asylum claim, an expert report or court testimony, the primary documents, evidence cut-off, applicable evidential rules and safety of affected persons and witnesses should be reviewed. Citation of an institution identifies a research source and does not constitute that institution’s endorsement of CRM’s conclusions.